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Abstract
Input/output logic is a formalism in deontic logic and normative reasoning. Unlike
deontic logical frameworks based on possible-world semantics, input/output logic
adopts norm-based semantics in the sense of (Hansen, 2014), specifically operational
semantics. It is well-known in theoretical computer science that complexity is an
indispensable component of every logic. So far, previous literature in input/output
systems focuses on proof theory and semantics, while neglects complexity. This
paper adds the missing component by giving the complexity results of main decision
problems in input/output logic. Our results show that input/output logic is coNP
hard and in the 2nd level of the polynomial hierarchy.
Keywords: input/output logic, decidability, complexity, deontic logic, norm-based se-
mantics
1 Introduction
Deontic logic is the logic of deontic modalities, such as obligation, permission, and pro-
hibition. It has been used since the 1950s as a formal instrument for modeling normative
reasoning (von Wright, 1968). Deontic logic has been studied in several research areas,
including philosophy, linguistics, and computer science; for a recent survey, we address
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the reader to (Gabbay et al., 2014). Many logical formalisms have been proposed to
model deontic statements. This paper focuses on input/output logic, which has been
originally introduced in (Makinson and van der Torre, 2000).
Input/output logic has been proposed with the aim of providing “a theoretical frame-
work for the use of norms and normative reasoning in applications in computer science,
law, linguistics, ethics, and other domains” ((Gabbay et al., 2014), pp. 501-502).
The key peculiarity of input/output is its norm-based semantics, in the sense of
(Hansen, 2014). Specifically, as it will be explained below in section 2, input/output logic
adopts a kind of norm-based semantics termed operational semantics: an input/output
system is conceived as a deductive machine, like a black box which produces deontic
statements as output, when we feed it factual statements as input.
Deontic frameworks grounded on norm-based semantics have been proposed as an
alternative to standard deontic frameworks grounded on possible-world semantics, such
as STIT logic (Horty, 2001) and dynamic deontic logic (Meyer, 1988; van der Meyden,
1996). Two main motivations are assumed to justify such an alternative semantics:
1. Philosophically, it is widely acknowledged that there is a distinction between norms
on the one hand, and declarative statements on the other. Declarative statements
may have truth-values, which means they are capable of being true or false; but
norms are not. They may be complied or violated. But it makes no sense to describe
norms as true or as false. Hence, it seems there cannot be a logic of norms: this is
the well-known Jørgensen’s dilemma (Jørgensen, 1937).
In input/output logic conditional norms do not bear truth values. They are not
embedded in compound formulae using truth-functional connectives. To keep clear
of all confusion, norms are not even treated as formulae, but simply as ordered
pairs (a, x) of logical formulae. if (a, x) is a mandatory norm, then it is read as
“given a, x is obligatory”. If it is a permissive norm, then it is read as “given a, x is
permitted”. Input/output logic aims at solving Jørgensen’s dilemma at its starting
line (cf. also (Makinson and van der Torre, 2003b)).
2. Norm-based semantics appears to offer a straightforward and simple way to deal
with moral conflicts, i.e. situations when an agent ought to perform two or more
actions but he cannot perform them all in that they conflict with each other (cf.
(Horty, 2003)). For instance, suppose an agent both ought to make an expensive
present to a friend and ought to save money to pay the rent. A standard way
to deal with them in norm-based semantics is extending the basic formalism with
priorities on norms in order to rank them according to certain preference criteria.
In input/output logic, such a solution has been proposed in (Parent, 2011), which
develops an extension of (Makinson and van der Torre, 2000)’s basic definitions
with prioritized norms in order to handle moral conflicts.
It is well-known in theoretical computer science that complexity is an indispensable com-
ponent of every logic. However, previous literature in input/output logic focuses on proof
theory and semantics, while neglects complexity. This paper adds the missing component,
thus completing the formal characterization of the logical framework.
This paper show that most decision problems of input/output logic are NP hard and in
the 2nd level of the polynomial hierarchy. Our results show that although the complexity
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of input/output logic is not low, it is not also astonishingly high. For example modal
logic is at least as complex as input/output logic because it is PSPACE complete.
The structure of the paper is quite simple. In section 2, we will formally introduce
the basic input/output systems to deal with obligations and permissions. In section 3 we
will show our complexity results, on each system presented in section 2. In section 4, we
discuss related work. Section 5 concludes this paper.
2 Input/output logic
Input/output logic takes its origin in the study of conditional norms and it has been
originally introduced in (Makinson and van der Torre, 2000). Input/output logic is not
a single logic but a family of logics, just like modal logic is a family of logics containing
systems K, KD, S4, S5, etc. However, unlike modal logic, which usually uses possible-world
semantics, input/output logic adopts operational semantics. An input/output system is
conceived as a deductive machine, like a black box which produces deontic statements as
output, when we feed it factual statements as input. Figure 1 is a brief visualization of
input/output logic.
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Figure 1: general input/output logic system
The set O represents the set of mandatory norms of a normative system. Formally,
it is a set of pairs (x, y), where x and y are formulae in some object logic, e.g. standard
propositional logic. Each pair (x, y) in O refers to a mandatory norm, in that it is read as
“given x, y is obligatory”. O corresponds to the deduction machine of the input/output
system: whenever one of the formulae in the left-hand side elements of the pairs is given
in input, the corresponding right-hand side elements are given in output.
As shown in the next section, in order to obtain a family of input/output logics, we add
axioms to the basic deductive system exemplified in Fig.1, thus restricting/constraining
the set of pairs belonging to O. But the pairs in O are never evaluated with respect
to a model, i.e. associated with truth values. The deductive machine simply matches
the input with the left-hand side elements of the pairs and returns the corresponding
right-hand side elements. In that sense the semantics is operational.
This section presents input/output logic along three subsections. Subsection 2.1 in-
troduces the eight unconstrained input/output logic used for modeling mandatory norms.
Each system features a different (operational) semantics, given in terms of sets of for-
mulae in the object logic associated with the inputs, which are again sets of formulae
in the object logic. The systems are obtained by adding derivation rules to the general
deductive machine depicted in Fig.1. The derivation rules are sound and complete with
respect to the corresponding desired semantics. In subsection 2.2, we review constrained
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input/output logic. In constrained input/output logic, the systems are equipped with the
(non-monotonic) capability of determining which obligations are operative in a situation
that already violates some of them and with a strategy that allows to solve conflicts,
in case of multiple choices. Finally, subsection 2.3 extends unconstrained input/output
logic systems fit to handle permissions.
2.1 Unconstrained input/output logic
Let P = {p0, p1, . . .} be a countable set of propositional letters and LP be the propositional
language built upon P. Let O ⊆ LP × LP be a set of ordered pairs of formulae of LP. A
pair (a, x) in O refers to a mandatory norm, in that it is read as “given a, x is obligatory”.
O can be viewed as a function from 2LP to 2LP such that for a set A of formulae,
O(A) = {x ∈ LP : (a, x) ∈ O for some a ∈ A}. Depending on the pairs included in O,
a different output is produced against an input A. (Makinson and van der Torre, 2000)
introduce four basic relevant outputs for an input A, called out1, out2, out3, and out4.
These are functions taking O and A as arguments defined as follows:
(1) • out1(O,A) = Cn(O(Cn(A))).
• out2(O,A) =
⋂{Cn(O(V )) : A ⊆ V, V is complete}.
• out3(O,A) =
⋂{Cn(O(B)) : A ⊆ B = Cn(B) ⊇ O(B)}.
• out4(O,A) =
⋂{Cn(O(V ) : A ⊆ V ⊇ O(V )), V is complete}.
Here Cn is the classical consequence operator of propositional logic. That is Cn(A) =
{a ∈ LP : A ` a}. A set of formulae is complete if it is either maximal consistent or
equal to LP. These four operators are called ‘simple-minded output’, ‘basic output’,
‘simple-minded reusable output’ and ‘basic reusable output’ respectively.
For each of these four operators, a throughput version that allows inputs to reappear
as outputs is defined as out+i (O,A) = outi(Oid, A), where Oid = O ∪ {(a, a) : a ∈ LP}.
When A is a singleton, we write outi(O, a) for outi(O, {a}). Thus, we obtain eight basic
input/output logic systems in total.
Input/output logics are given a proof theoretic characterization. We say that an
ordered pair of formulae (a, x) is derivable from a set O iff (a, x) is in the least set that
extends O ∪ {(>,>)} and is closed under a number of derivation rules (axioms). The
following are the derivation rules we need for out1 to out
+
4 :
(2) • SI (strengthening the input): from (a, x) to (b, x) whenever a ∈ Cn({b}).
• WO (weakening the output): from (a, x) to (a, y) whenever y ∈ Cn({x}).
• AND (conjunction of output): from (a, x) and (a, y) to (a, x ∧ y).
• OR (disjunction of input): from (a, x) and (b, x) to (a ∨ b, x).
• CT (cumulative transitivity): from (a, x) and (a ∧ x, y) to (a, y).
• ID (identity): from nothing to (a, a).
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The derivation system based on the rules SI, WO and AND is called deriv1. Adding OR
to deriv1 gives deriv2. Adding CT to deriv1 gives deriv3. The five rules together give
deriv4. Adding ID to derivi gives deriv
+
i for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. (a, x) ∈ derivi(O) is used to
denote that the norms (a, x) is derivable from O ∪ {(>,>)} using rules of derivi.
In (Makinson and van der Torre, 2000), the following soundness and completeness the-
orems are given, in order to prove that the semantics of the derivation systems generated
from the axioms in (2) are exactly the ones in (1):
Theorem 2.1 Given a set of mandatory norms O and a formula a,
• x ∈ outi(O, a) iff (a, x) ∈ derivi(O), for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
• x ∈ out+i (O, a) iff (a, x) ∈ deriv+i (O), for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
2.2 Constrained input/output logic
An important feature deontic frameworks must have is the ability of determining which
obligations are detached in a situation that already violates some among them. In case
an agent already violates a norm, we are still interested in knowing if it violates other
norms, and so more penalties ought to be applied. In input/output logic, this is handled
by introducing the definitions of maxfamily and outfamily, which lead to the concept
of constrained input/output logic (Makinson and van der Torre, 2001):
Definition 2.1 Given a set of mandatory norms O, a set of input A ⊆ LP and a set of
constraints C ⊆ LP, for i ∈ {1, . . . , 4, 1+, . . . , 4+}:
• maxfamilyi(O,A,C) = {O′ ⊆ O : outi(O′, A)∪C is satisfiable, and outi(O′′, A) ∪
C is not satisfiable, for every O′ ( O′′}.
• outfamilyi(O,A,C) = {outi(O′, A) : O′ ∈ maxfamilyi(O,A,C)}
According to the definitions, maxfamilyi(O,A,C) is the family of all maximal subsets
O′ of O such that outi(O′, A) is consistent with C, while outfamilyi(O,A,C) is the
family of all such set outi(O
′, A). When C=∅, outi(O′, A) has to be internally consistent,
i.e. it must not be possible to derive a contradiction (⊥) by conjoining the formulae in
outi(O
′, A). When C=A, the output has to be consistent with the input, i.e. it must not
be possible to derive ⊥ by conjoining the formulae occurring either in outi(O′, A) or in A
(or in both). maxfamily and outfamily allow to straightforwardly overcome well-known
limits of standard deontic logic, above all dealing with contrary-to-duty reasoning, i.e.
reasoning about what to do in the face of violations of obligations.
To understand how maxfamily and outfamily work in practice, we report below an
example taken from (Makinson and van der Torre, 2003b). Other examples, including
the well-known Chisholm’s and Forrester’s paradoxes, may be found in (Makinson and
van der Torre, 2001) and (Gabbay et al., 2014).
Suppose we have the following two norms: “The cottage should not have a fence or
a dog” and “if it has a dog it must have both a fence and a warning sign.” We may
formalize these as:
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O = {(>,¬(f ∨ d)), (d, f ∧ w)}.
Suppose further that we are in the situation that the cottage has a dog, i.e. that our
input context is A = {d}. In this context, the first norm is violated. Still we have to
check if the cottage has both a fence and a warning sign. maxfamily and outfamily
determine the obligations that are still in effect in the scenario. When C=A, it holds1:
• maxfamilyi(O,A, {d}) = {{(d, f ∧ w)}}
• outfamilyi(O,A, {d}) = {Cn(f ∧ w)}
Thus, maxfamilyi(O,A, {d}) tells us that the second obligation is still operative in the
scenario although the first one has been already violated. This agrees with the intuitive
assessment of the example: given the norms in O and A = {d}, our cottage must have
both a fence and a warning sign.
Looking at the maximal subsets consistent with a set of constraints is a technique that
is well-known in the more specific areas of belief change and non-monotonic reasoning.
In the non-monotonic reasoning literature2, it is likewise well-known that it is possible
to identify two kinds of non-monotonic reasoning types: the credulous and the skeptical
reasoning types, which allow to deal with non-resolvable conflicts in two different (op-
posite) ways. In input/output logic, a non-resolvable conflict corresponds to a scenario
where outfamily contains more than one set (and so maxfamily). The credulous and
the skeptical reasoning types are obtained by joining and intersecting the sets in the
outfamily respectively, via two additional operators termed “full-join output” (out∪i )
and “full-meet output” (out∩i ):
Definition 2.2 Given a set of mandatory norms O, a set of input A ⊆ LP and a set of
constraints C ⊆ LP, for i ∈ {1, . . . , 4, 1+, . . . , 4+}.
• out∪i (O,A,C) =
⋃
outfamilyi(O,A,C) [credulous]
• out∩i (O,A,C) =
⋂
outfamilyi(O,A,C) [skeptical ]
To understand how out∪i (O,A,C) and out
∩
i (O,A,C) work in practice, we report below
an example taken from (Makinson and van der Torre, 2001).
Consider the obligations “if Alice is invited to dinner then Bob must be invited too”,
“if Bob is invited to dinner then Carol must be invited too”, and “if Carol is invited
to dinner then Alice must be not invited”. These three obligations are formalized as:
O = {(a, b), (b, c), (c,¬a)}. Suppose further that Alice is invited to dinner, i.e. A = {a}.
In the input/output system out3 it holds:
• maxfamily3(O,A,A) = {{(a, b), (b, c)}, {(a, b), (c,¬a)}, {(b, c), (c,¬a)}}
• outfamily3(O,A,A) = {Cn(b, c), Cn(b), Cn(∅)}
• out∪3 (O,A,A) =
⋃
outfamily3(O,A,A) = Cn(b, c)
1On the other hand, if C=∅, maxfamilyi(O,A, ∅) = {{(>,¬(f ∨ d))}, {(d, f ∧ w)}} and
outfamilyi(O,A, ∅) = {{Cn(¬(f ∨ d))}, {Cn(f ∧ w)}}.
2Cf. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-nonmonotonic.
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• out∩3 (O,A,A) =
⋂
outfamily3(O,A,A) = Cn(∅)
In this scenario, under the credulous inference we are still obliged to invite Bob and Carol.
On the other hand, under the skeptical inference we are not obliged to invite anyone else.
2.3 Permissive input/output logic
The definitions presented in subsection 2.1 only allow to deal with obligations. On the
other hand, in input/output logic also permissions have been studied in depth. In order
to handle permissions in input/output systems, we simply define another set P ⊆ LP×LP
of ordered pairs of formulae of LP. A pair (a, x) ∈ P , call it a permissive norm, is read
as “given a, x is permitted”. N = (O,P ), where O is a set of mandatory norms and P a
set of permissive norms, is called a normative system.
It is common in philosophy to distinguish between two kinds of permissions: negative
permission and positive permission. Something is negatively permitted if and only if it
is not prohibited by the norms, i.e., if and only if it is not explicitly asserted that it is
not permitted. On the other hand, something is positively permitted if and only if it
can be derived from the norms. Negative permission is straightforward to describe while
positive permission is more elusive. In what sense something may be derived from the
norms? (Makinson and van der Torre, 2003a) introduce two types of positive permission:
static and dynamic permission. Here is an example from (Makinson and van der Torre,
2003a) to distinguish these two kinds of positive permission: assume the normative system
includes the obligation “A man is obliged to pay tax on condition of having salary.” and
the permission “A man is permitted to vote on condition of being older than 18.”. Now
the question is, according to the given normative system:
Is a man permitted to vote on the condition of having salary?
In one sense the answer is ‘no’. If we stick to the straight derivation, a man’s having
salary does not imply that he is older than 18. Therefore we cannot derive he is permitted
to vote. This is one notion of positive permission, the static permission. In another sense
the answer is ‘yes’. The reason is: suppose we add “A man is not permitted to vote on
the condition of having salary” to the normative system. We will make the normative
system incoherent in the sense that when the normative system is applied to a man who
has salary and is older than 18, then he is permitted to vote meanwhile not permitted to
vote. This is another notion of positive permission, the dynamic permission.
Formal definitions of the three type of permission are introduced in (Makinson and
van der Torre, 2003a).
Definition 2.3 (negative permission) Given a normative system N = (O,P ) and a
set of formulae A:
NegPermi(N,A) = {x ∈ LP : ¬x 6∈ outi(O,A)}.
Intuitively, x is negatively permitted iff x is not forbidden. Since a formula is forbidden
iff its negation is obligatory, x is not forbidden is equivalent to ¬x is not obligatory.
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Definition 2.4 (positive-static permission) Given a normative system N = (O,P )
and a set of formulae A,
• If P 6= ∅, then StaPermi(N,A) = {x ∈ LP : x ∈ outi(O ∪ {(a′, x′)}, A),
for some (a′, x′) ∈ P}.
• If P = ∅, then StaPermi(N,A) = outi(O,A).
Intuitively, positive-static permissive norms are treated like weak mandatory norms,
the basic difference is that while the latter may be used jointly, the former may only be
applied one by one.
Definition 2.5 (positive-dynamic permission) Given a normative systemN = (O,P )
and a finite set of formulae A:
x ∈ DyPermi(N,A) iff there is a consistent set of formulae C such that
StaPermi(N,C) ∪ outi(O ∪ {(
∧
A,¬x)}, C) is inconsistent.
Intuitively, x is dynamically permitted given condition A iff the prohibition of x under
condition A, that is, taking (
∧
A,¬ x) as a mandatory norm, will create inconsistency of
the normative system with respect to some consistent input C.
In order to clarify the difference between static and dynamic permission, let’s consider
again the example above. In that scenario, two norms hold: “a man is obliged to pay
tax on condition of having salary” and “a man is permitted to vote on condition of being
older than 18”. We want to know if a man is permitted to vote on condition of having
salary. The normative system is formalized as follows:
O = {(s, t)} P = {(> 18, v)} A={s}
In this normative system, a man is not statically permitted to vote, in that v does not
belong to StaPermi(N,A), for all i = {1, 2, 3, 4}:
StaPermi(N,A) = {x ∈ LP : x ∈ outi({(s, t)} ∪ {(> 18, v)}, {s}) = {t}
On the other hand, a man is dynamically permitted to vote. In line with the example,
let’s consider a man who has salary and is older than 18, i.e., let’s consider a consistent
set C={s, > 18}. For all i = {1, 2, 3, 4}, we obtain:
StaPermi(N , {s, > 18}) ∪ outi({(s, t)} ∪ {(s,¬v)}, {s, > 18} ) =
{t, v} ∪ {t,¬v} = {t, v, t,¬v}
Since {t, v, t,¬v} is inconsistent, v ∈ DyPermi(N,A), i.e., a man is permitted to vote.
3 On the complexity of input/output logic
The present section, after a rapid excursion on the background ingredients we are going
to use in our proofs, in subsection 3.1, presents theorems on the complexity of the basic
computational problems in the input/output logic systems illustrated in the previous
section. To enhance comprehension, we analyze (the complexity of) the input/output
logic systems in the same order and with the same structure into subsections.
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3.1 Background - complexity theory
We assume the readers are familiar with notions like Turing machine and the complexity
class P, NP and coNP. More comprehensive introduction of complexity theory can be found
in (Arora and Barak, 2009). The following complexity results of a fragment of modal
logic will be used in this paper.
Theorem 3.1 (Halpern, 1995)
1. The satisfiability problem of modal logic K of model depth 1 is NP-complete.
2. The satisfiability problem of modal logic T of model depth 1 is NP-complete.
The boolean hierarchy is the hierarchy of boolean combinations (intersection, union and
complementation) of NP classes. BH1 is the same as NP. BH2 is the class of languages
which are the intersection of a language in NP and a language in coNP. (Wagner, 1986)
shows that the following 2-parity SAT problem is complete for BH2:
Given two propositional formulae x1 and x2 such that if x2 is satisfiable then x1 is
satisfiable, is it true that x1 is satisfiable while x2 is not?
Oracle Turing machine and two complexity classes related to oracle Turing machine will
be used in this paper.
Definition 3.1 (oracle Turing machine (Arora and Barak, 2009)) An oracle for
a language L is a device that is capable of reporting whether any string w is a member of
L. An oracle Turing machine ML is a modified Turing machine that has the additional
capability of querying an oracle. Whenever ML writes a string on a special oracle tape
it is informed whether that string is a member of L, in a single computation step.
PNP is the class of problems solvable by a deterministic polynomial time Turing machine
with an NP oracle. NPNP is the class of problems solvable by a non-deterministic polynomial
time Turing machine with an NP oracle.
NPNP and coNPNP are also termed as Σp2 and Π
p
2 respectively, to mark the fact that NP
NP
and coNPNP belong to the 2nd level of the polynomial hierarchy. However, for the sake of
uniform terminology, in what follows we will continue to use the symbols NPNP and coNPNP
to refer to the two classes of problems.
3.2 Complexity of unconstrained input/output logic
The complexity of input/output logic has been sparsely studied in the past. Although
the reversibility of derivation rules as a proof re-writing mechanism has been studied
for the input/output logic framework (Makinson and van der Torre, 2000), the length
or complexity of such proofs have not been developed. We approach the complexity
of unconstrained input/output logic from a semantic point of view. We focus on the
following fulfillment problem:
Given a finite set of mandatory norms O, a finite set of formulae A and a formula x, is
x ∈ out(O,A)?
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3.2.1 Complexity of out1 and out
+
1
We start with the complexity of out1. The following theorem shows that out1 has the
same complexity as propositional logic in the sense that both the fulfillment problem of
out1 and the validity problem of propositional logic is coNP-complete.
Theorem 3.2 The fulfillment problem of simple-minded input/output logic out1 is coNP-
complete.
Proof Concerning the coNP hardness, we prove by reducing the validity problem of
propositional logic to the fulfillment problem of simple- minded input/output logic: given
an arbitrary x ∈ LP, ` x iff x ∈ Cn(>) iff x ∈ Cn(O(Cn(A))) where O = ∅ iff x ∈
out1(O,A) where O = ∅.
Now we prove the coNP membership. We provide the following non-deterministic
Turing machine to solve the complement of our problem. Let O = {(a1, x1), . . . , (an, xn)},
A be a finite set of formulae and x be a formula.
1. Guess a sequence of valuations V1, . . . , Vn and V
′ on the propositional letters ap-
pearing in A ∪ {a1, . . . , an} ∪ {x1, . . . , xn} ∪ {x}.
2. Let O′ ⊆ O be the set of norms which contains all (ai, xi) such that Vi(A) = 1 and
Vi(ai) = 0.
3. Let X = {x : (a, x) ∈ O −O′}.
4. If V ′(X) = 1 and V ′(x) = 0. Then return “accept” on this branch. Otherwise
return “reject” on this branch.
The main intuition of the proof is: O′ collects all norms which cannot be triggered3 by
A. On some branches we must have that O′ contains exactly those norms which are not
triggered by A. In those lucky branches X is the same as O(Cn(A)). If there is a valuation
V ′ such that V ′(X) = 1 and V ′(x) = 0, then we know x 6∈ Cn(X) = Cn(O(Cn(A))).
It can be verified that x 6∈ Cn(O(Cn(A))) iff the algorithm returns “accept” on some
branches and the time complexity of the Turing machine is polynomial. a
Now we move the the complexity of out+1 . The following lemma will be used.
Lemma 3.3 out+1 (O,A) = Cn(A ∪O(Cn(A))).
Proof Assume x ∈ out+1 (O,A) = out1(Oid, A). Then x ∈ Cn(Oid(Cn(A))) = Cn((O ∪
{(a, a) : a ∈ LP})(Cn(A))) = Cn(O(Cn(A))∪({(a, a) : a ∈ LP})(Cn(A))) = Cn(O(Cn(A))∪
Cn(A)). Therefore there are some x1, . . . , xn ∈ O(Cn(A)) ∪ Cn(A) such that x1 ∧
. . . ∧ xn ` x. Without loss of generality, assume x1, . . . , xn−1 ∈ O(Cn(A)) and xn ∈
Cn(A). Then there are some y1, . . . , ym such that y1 ∧ . . . ∧ ym ` xn. Then we know
x1, . . . , xn−1, y1, . . . , ym ∈ O(Cn(A))∪A and x1∧ . . . , xn−1∧y1∧ . . .∧ym ` x. Therefore
x ∈ Cn(A ∪O(Cn(A))).
Assume x ∈ Cn(A∪O(Cn(A))), then x ∈ Cn(Cn(A)∪O(Cn(A))) = Cn(O(Cn(A))∪
({(a, a) : a ∈ LP})(Cn(A))) = Cn(Oid(Cn(A))) = out+1 (O,A). a
3We say a norm (a, x) is triggered by A if a ∈ Cn(A)).
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Theorem 3.4 The fulfillment problem of simple-minded output throughput input/output
logic out+1 is coNP-complete.
Proof Concerning the lower bound, we prove by a reduction from the validity problem of
propositional logic: given arbitrary x ∈ LP, ` x iff x ∈ Cn(>) iff x ∈ Cn(A∪O(Cn(A)))
where O = ∅ = A iff x ∈ out+1 (O,A) where O = ∅ = A.
Concerning the upper bound, we prove by giving a non-deterministic Turing machine
similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 3.2. The only change is now in step 4 we test
if V ′(A ∪X) = 1 and V ′(x) = 0. It can be verified that x 6∈ Cn(A ∪ O(Cn(A))) iff the
non-deterministic Turing machine returns “accept” on some branch. By Lemma 3.3 we
know this Turing machine solves our problem. a
3.2.2 Complexity of out2 and out
+
2
Let s(O) = {x : (a, x) ∈ O} be the projection of O to the second component of its
consisting norms. Let O = {a → x : (a, x) ∈ O}. Here  is the necessity modality
of modal logic K. Let `K be the consequence relation of modal logic K. The following
theorem reveals the relation between basic input/output logic and modal logic, and is
useful in the complexity proof.
Theorem 3.5 (Makinson and van der Torre, 2000)
x ∈ out2(O,A) iff x ∈ Cn(s(O)) and O ∪A `K x.
Theorem 3.6 The fulfillment problem of basic input/output logic out2 is coNP-complete.
Proof Concerning the lower bound, we prove by a reduction from the validity problem
of propositional logic: given arbitrary x ∈ LP, ` x iff x ∈ Cn(∅) iff x ∈ out2(O,A) where
O = ∅.
Concerning the upper bound, we prove by polynomially reducing the fulfillment prob-
lem of basic input/output logic to the validity problem of modal logic K with modal depth
1. Theorem 3.5 gives us the key idea of the reduction. By Theorem 3.5, x ∈ out2(O,A)
iff `K (
∧
s(O) → x) ∧ ((∧O ∧ A) → x). Then by Theorem 3.1 we know the upper
bound is coNP. a
To study the complexity of out+2 , we make use of the materialisation of norms intro-
duced by (Makinson and van der Torre, 2000). Let m(O) = {a → x : (a, x) ∈ O} be
the materialisation of O. That is, the operator m(•) transforms a norms (a, x) into a
classical implication a → x. The following theorem shows that input/output logic can
be reduced to propositional logic via the materialisation of norms.
Theorem 3.7 (Makinson and van der Torre, 2000)
out+2 (O,A) = out
+
4 (O,A) = Cn(A ∪m(O)).
Theorem 3.8
1. The fulfillment problem of basic throughput input/output logic out+2 is coNP-complete.
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2. The fulfillment problem of basic reusable throughput input/output logic out+4 is coNP-
complete.
Proof Given Theorem 3.7, the proof is routine: x ∈ out+2 (O,A) iff x ∈ Cn(A ∪m(O))
iff A ∪m(O) ` x iff ` ∧(A ∪m(O))→ x. a
3.2.3 Complexity of out3 and out
+
3
To study the complexity of out3, we make use of a fixed-point characterization of out3
developed by Sun (2014). Given a set O of mandatory norms and a set A of formulae,
we define a function fOA : 2
LP → 2LP such that fOA (X) = Cn(A∪O(X)). It can be proved
that fOA is monotonic with respect to the set theoretical ⊆ relation, and (2LP ,⊆) is a
complete lattice. Then by Tarski’s fixed point theorem there exists a least fixed point of
fOA . The following proposition shows that the least fixed point can be constructed in an
inductive manner.
Proposition 3.9 (Sun, 2014) Let BOA be the least fixed point of the function f
O
A . Then
BOA =
⋃∞
i=0B
O
A,i, where B
O
A,0 = Cn(A), B
O
A,i+1 = Cn(A ∪O(BOA,i)).
Using the least fixed point, a more constructive semantics of out3 and out
+
3 are stated
as follows, such semantics gives us insights to develop algorithms to solve the fulfillment
problem of reusable input/output logic:
Theorem 3.10 (Sun, 2014) For a set of norms O and a formula a,
1. (a, x) ∈ deriv3(O) iff x ∈ Cn(O(BO{a})).
2. (a, x) ∈ deriv+3 (O) iff x ∈ Cn(Oid(BOid{a} )).
Theorem 3.11 The fulfillment problem of simple-minded reusable input/output logic
out3 is between coNP and P
NP.
Proof The lower bound can be proved using the same reduction as in the the proof of the
lower bound of out1. Concerning the upper bound, we provide the following algorithm
on an oracle Turing machine with oracle SAT .
Let O = {(a1, x1), . . . , (an, xn)}, A be a finite set of formulae and x be a formula.
1. Let X = A, Y = Z = O, U = ∅.
2. for each (ai, xi) ∈ Y , ask the oracle if ¬(
∧
X → ai) is satisfiable.
(a) If “no”, then let X = X ∪ {xi}, Z = Z − {(ai, xi)}.
(b) Otherwise do nothing.
3. If Y = Z, goto 4. Otherwise let Y = Z, goto step 2.
4. for each (ai, xi) ∈ O, ask the oracle if ¬(
∧
X → ai) is satisfiable.
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(a) If “no”, then let U = U ∪ {xi}.
(b) Otherwise do nothing
5. Ask the oracle if ¬(∧U → x) is satisfiable.
(a) If “no”, then return “accept”.
(b) Otherwise return “reject”.
Theorem 3.10 is useful to prove the correctness of the above algorithm. Here we just
state some crucial points: from step 1 to step 3, the algorithm generates X as the least
fixed point of fOA . In step 4, U is generated, which should be understood as O(X).
Concerning the time complexity, the times of loop in step 2 is at most n. Each loop
can be finished in polynomial time. Therefore all the loops in step 2 can be done in
polynomial time. Step 3 calls for step 2 for at most n times. Therefore it can still be
done in polynomial time. The times of loop in step 4 is exactly n. Each loop can be
finished in polynomial time. Therefore all the loops in step 4 can be done in polynomial
time. Step 5 can be done in polynomial time. Therefore the algorithm is polynomial. a
We use the following examples to illustrate how the above algorithm works.
Example 1 Let p, q, r, s and t be propositional letters. Let O = {(p, q), (q, r), (p ∧
r, s), (t, t)}, A = {p}, t→ s ∈ out3(O,A) is computed as follows:
1. Let X = A = {p}, Y = Z = O = {(p, q), (q, r), (p ∧ r, s), (t, t)}, U = ∅.
2. Compute whether {p} ` p, {p} ` q, {p} ` p ∧ r, {p} ` t.
3. Let X = {p, q}, Z = {(q, r), (p ∧ r, s), (t, t)}.
4. Compare if Y = Z. The result is negative. So let Y = {(q, r), (p ∧ r, s), (t, t)}
5. Compute whether {p, q} ` q, {p, q} ` p ∧ r, {p} ` t.
6. Let X = {p, q, r}. Z = {(p ∧ r, s), (t, t)}.
7. Compare if Y = Z. The result is negative. So let Y = {(p ∧ r, s), (t, t)}.
8. Compute whether {p, q, r} ` p ∧ r, {p} ` t.
9. Let X = {p, q, r, s}. Z = {(t, t)}.
10. Compare if Y = Z. The result is negative. So let Y = {(t, t)}.
11. Compute whether {p, q, r, x} ` t.
12. Let X = {p, q, r, s}. Z = {(t, t)}.
13. Compare if Y = Z. The result is positive.
14. Compute whether {p, q, r, s} ` p, {p, q, r, s} ` q, {p, q, r, s} ` p ∧ r, {p, q, r, s} ` t.
15. Let U = {q, r, s}.
16. Compute whether {q, r, s} ` t→ s. The answer is positive, so we conclude t→ s ∈
out3(O,A).
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Theorem 3.12 The fulfillment problem of simple-minded reusable throughput input/output
logic out+3 is between coNP and P
NP.
Proof The lower bound can be proved using the same reduction as in the the proof of
the lower bound of out1. Concerning the upper bound, we prove by giving an algorithm
similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 3.11. We make the following change:
• In step 2 and 4 we ask the oracle if ¬(∧A ∧∧X → ai) is satisfiable.
• In step 5 we ask the oracle if ¬(∧A ∧∧U → ai) is satisfiable. a
Example 2 Let p, q, r and s be propositional letters. Let O = {(p, q ∧ r), (p ∧ r, s)},
A = {p}, ¬p ∧ s ∈ out+3 (O,A) is computed as follows:
1. Let X = A = {p}, Y = Z = O = {(p, q ∧ r), (p ∧ r, s)}, U = ∅.
2. Compute whether {p} ` p, {p} ` p ∧ r.
3. Let X = {p, q ∧ r}, Z = {(p ∧ r, s)}.
4. Compare if Y = Z. The result is negative. So let Y = {(p ∧ r, s)}.
5. Compute whether {p, q ∧ r} ` p ∧ r.
6. Let X = {p, q ∧ r, s}. Z = ∅.
7. Compare if Y = Z. The result is negative. So let Y = ∅.
8. Compute whether {p, q ∧ r, s} ` p, {p, q ∧ r, s} ` p ∧ r
9. Let U = {r, s}.
10. Compute whether A∪U = {p, r, s} ` ¬p∧s. The answer is negative, so we conclude
¬p ∧ s 6∈ out33(O,A).
3.2.4 Complexity of out4
Similar to out2, out4 can also be translated to modal logic.
Theorem 3.13 (Makinson and van der Torre, 2000) x ∈ out4(O,A) iff x ∈ Cn(s(O))
and O ∪A `T x. Here `T is the consequence relation of modal logic T .
Theorem 3.14 The fulfillment problem of basic reusable input/output logic out4 is coNP-
complete.
Proof The lower bound can be proved using the same reduction as in the the proof of the
lower bound of out1. Concerning the upper bound, we prove by polynomially reducing
the fulfillment problem of basic reusable input/output logic to the validity problem of
modal logic T with modal depth 1. Theorem 3.13 gives us the key idea of the reduction.
By Theorem 3.13, x ∈ out4(O,A) iff `T (
∧
s(O) → x) ∧ ((∧O ∧ A) → x). Then by
Theorem 3.1 we know the upper bound is coNP. a
14
3.3 Complexity of constrained input/output logic
In the constrained setting, a finite set of mandatory norms O and a subset O′ ⊆ O, a
finite set of input A and a finite set of constrains C are given. We study the complexity
of the following problems:
• consistency checking: is outi(O,A) consistent with C?
• maxfamily membership: is O′ ∈ maxfamilyi(O, A,C)?
• full-join fulfillment: is x ∈ out∪i (O,A,C)?
• full-meet fulfillment: is x ∈ out∩i (O,A,C)?
Theorem 3.15
• For i ∈ {1, 2, 4, 1+, 2+, 4+}, the consistency checking problem is NP complete.
• For i ∈ {3, 3+}, the consistency checking problem is NP hard and in PNP.
Proof The NP hard problem SAT can be reduced to the consistency checking problem,
which gives us the result of the lower bound. The consistency checking problem can be
solved by a reduction to the complement of the fulfillment problem, which gives us the
result of the upper bound: outi(O,A) is consistent with C iff C ∪ outi(O,A) is satisfiable
iff outi(O,A) 6` ¬
∧
C iff ¬∧C 6∈ outi(O,A). a
We show now that the maxfamily membership problem is BH2 complete, where BH2 is
the class of languages which are the intersection of a language in NP and a language in
coNP (cf. section 3.1 above).
Theorem 3.16 For i ∈ {1, 2, 4, 1+, 2+, 4+}, the maxfamily membership problem is BH2
complete.
Proof The BH2 hardness can be proved by a reduction from the 2-Parity SAT problem.
Suppose we are given two formulae x1 and x2 such that (if x2 is satisfiable, then x1 is
satisfiable). Our aim is to answer the question: is it true that (x1 is satisfiable but x2 is
not satisfiable)?
Let O = {(>, x1 ∨ x2), (>, x2)}, A = C = ∅, O′ = {(>, x1 ∨ x2)}.
• If O′ ∈ maxfamilyi(O,A,C) then outi(O′, A) = Cn(x1 ∨ x2) is consistent and
outi(O,A) = Cn((x1 ∨x2)∧x2) is inconsistent. Therefore x1 ∨x2 is satisfiable and
(x1 ∨ x2)∧ x2 is not satisfiable. Then we know x2 is not satisfiable. It then follows
that x1 is satisfiable because otherwise x1 ∨ x2 is not satisfiable.
• If x1 is satisfiable and x2 is not satisfiable, then x1 ∨ x2 is satisfiable. Therefore
outi(O
′, A) is consistent and outi(O,A) is inconsistent. It then follows that O′ ∈
maxfamilyi(O,A,C).
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So we have proved x1 is satisfiable and x2 is not satisfiable iff O
′ ∈ maxfamilyi(O,A,C),
which proves the BH2 hardness.
Concerning the BH2 membership, let O = O
′ ∪ {(a1, x1), . . . , (an, xn)}. Then O′ ∈
maxfamilyi(O,A,C) iff C is consistent with outi(O
′, A) but not consistent with outi(O′∪
{(aj , xj)}, A) for every j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Since deciding if C is consistent with outi(O′, A)
is in NP and deciding if C is not consistent with outi(O
′ ∪ {(aj , xj)}, A) is in coNP, we
know that deciding if O′ ∈ maxfamilyi(O,A,C) is in BH2. a
Theorem 3.17 For i ∈ {3, 3+}, the maxfamily membership problem is BH2 hard and in
PNP.
Proof The BH2 hardness can be proved just like other input/output logics.
Concerning the upper bound, let O = O′ ∪ {(a1, x1), . . . , (an, xn)}. Then O′ ∈
maxfamily(O,A,C) iff C is consistent with outi(O
′, A) but not consistent with outi(O′∪
{(aj , xj)}, A) for every j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Since deciding if C is consistent with outi(O′, A)
is in PNP and deciding if C is not consistent with outi(O
′ ∪{(aj , xj)}, A) is also in PNP, we
know that deciding if O′ ∈ maxfamilyi(O,A,C) is in PNP. a
Theorem 3.18 For i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 1+, 2+, 3+, 4+}, the full-join fulfillment problem is NPNP
complete.
Proof Concerning the NPNP membership, we prove by giving the following algorithm on
a non-deterministic Turing machine with an NP oracle to solve our problem.
1. Guess a subset O′ ⊆ O.
2. Use the NP oracle to test if O′ ∈ maxfamilyi(O,A,C). If no, return “reject” on
this branch. Otherwise continue.
3. Use the NP oracle to test if x ∈ outi(O′, A). If x ∈ outi(O′, A), then return “accept”
on this branch. Otherwise return “reject” on this branch.
It can be verified that x ∈ out∪(O,A,C) iff the non-deterministic Turing machine
returns “accept” on some branches. Step 2 can be done in polynomial time steps because
the maxfamily membership problem is in PNP. Step 3 can also be done in polynomial
time steps because the fulfillment problem is also in PNP. Therefore the time complexity
of this non- deterministic Turing machine is polynomial.
Concerning the NPNP hardness, we show that the validity problem of 2-QBF∃ can be
reduced to the full-join fulfillment problem.
Let ∃p1 . . . pm∀q1 . . . qnΦ be a 2-QBF∃ where Φ is a propositional formula with vari-
ables in {p1, . . . , pm, q1, . . . , qn}. Let A = C = ∅, O = {(>, p1), . . . , (>, pm), (>,¬p1),
. . . , (>,¬pm), (>,¬Φ)}. Our aim is to show that this 2-QBF∃ is valid iff Φ ∈ out∪i (O,A,C).
• If ∃p1 . . . pm∀q1 . . . qnΦ is valid, then there is a valuation V for {p1, . . . , pm} such
that for all valuations V ′ for {q1, . . . , qn}, V ∪ V ′ gives truth value 1 to Φ and 0 to
¬Φ. Let O′ = {(>, p′1), . . . , (>, p′m)}, where each p′i is pi if pi ∈ V and it is ¬pi if
pi 6∈ V . Then O′ ∈ maxfamilyi(O,A,C) because outi(O′, A) = Cn({p′1, . . . , p′m})
is consistent with C and adding anything from {(>,¬p1), . . . , (>,¬pm), (>,¬Φ)}
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to O′ will destroy the consistency. Note that Φ ∈ Cn({p′1, . . . , p′m}) by the con-
struction of {p′1, . . . , p′m}. Therefore Φ ∈ outi(O′, A), which further implies that
Φ ∈ out∪i (O,A,C).
• If ∃p1 . . . pm∀q1 . . . qnΦ is not valid, then for all valuations V for {p1, . . . , pm} there
is a valuation V ′ for {q1, . . . , qn} such that V ∪ V ′ gives truth value 0 to Φ and
1 to ¬Φ. Let O′ = {(>, p′1), . . . , (>, p′m), (>,¬Φ)} be an arbitrary set such that
each p′i is either pi or ¬pi. Then outi(O′, A) = Cn({p′1 . . . , p′m,¬Φ}), which is
consistent. Moreover it can be verified that O′ ∈ maxfamilyi(O,A,C). Therefore
¬Φ ∈ outi(O′, A) and Φ 6∈ outi(O′, A). By the construction we can further verify
that O′ ranges over all elements of maxfamilyi(O,A,C). Then we conclude Φ 6∈
out∪i (O, A,C).
So we have reduced the validity problem of 2-QBF∃ to the full-join fulfillment problem,
which shows the latter is NPNP hard. a
In the setting of normative/legal reasoning, the full-meet and full-join fulfillment
problems are the two most important decision problems of input/output logic. The full-
meet and full-join operators are the operators our artificial moral agents will use to reason
on obligations.
Theorem 3.19 For i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 1+, 2+, 3+, 4+}, the full-meet fulfillment problem is
coNPNP complete.
Proof Concerning the coNPNP membership, we prove by giving the following algorithm
on a non-deterministic Turing machine with an NP oracle to solve the complement of our
problem.
1. Guess a subset O′ ⊆ O.
2. Use the NP oracle to test if O′ ∈ maxfamilyi(O,A,C). If no, return “reject” on
this branch. Otherwise continue.
3. Use the NP oracle to test if x 6∈ outi(O′, A). If x 6∈ outi(O′, A), then return “accept”
on this branch. Otherwise return “reject” on this branch.
It can be verified that x 6∈ out∩(O,A,C) iff the non-deterministic Turing machine
returns “accept” on some branches. Step 2 can be done in polynomial time steps because
the maxfamily membership problem is in PNP. Step 3 can also be done in polynomial
time steps because the fulfillment problem is also in PNP. Therefore the time complexity
of this non-deterministic Turing machine is polynomial.
Concerning the coNPNP hardness, we show that the validity problem of 2-QBF∀ can
be reduced to the full-meet fulfillment problem.
Let ∀p1 . . . pm∃q1 . . . qnΦ be a 2-QBF∀ where Φ is a propositional formula with vari-
ables in {p1, . . . , pm, q1, . . . , qn}. Let A = C = ∅, O = {(>, p1), . . . , (>, pm), (>,¬p1), . . . ,
(>,¬pm), (>,Φ)}. Our aim is to show that this 2-QBF∀ is valid iff Φ ∈ out∩i (O,A,C).
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• If ∀p1 . . . pm∃q1 . . . qnΦ is valid, then for all valuations V for {p1, . . . , pm} there is
a valuation V ′ for {q1, . . . , qn} such that V ∪ V ′ gives truth value 1 to Φ and 0 to
¬Φ.
Let O′ = {(>, p′1), . . . , (>, p′m), (>,Φ)} be an arbitrary set such that each p′i is either
pi or ¬pi. Then outi(O′, A) = Cn({p′1 . . . , p′m,Φ}), which is consistent. Moreover
it can be verified that O′ ∈ maxfamilyi(O,A,C). Therefore Φ ∈ outi(O′, A).
By the construction we can further verify that O′ ranges over all elements of
maxfamilyi(O,A,C). Then we conclude Φ ∈ out∩i (O, A,C).
• If ∀p1 . . . pm∃q1 . . . qnΦ is not valid, then there is a valuation V for {p1, . . . , pm}
such that for all valuations V ′ for {q1, . . . , qn}, V ∪V ′ gives truth value 0 to Φ and
1 to ¬Φ.
Let O′ = {(>, p′1), . . . , (>, p′m)}, where each p′i is pi if pi ∈ V and it is ¬pi if
pi 6∈ V . Then O′ ∈ maxfamilyi(O,A,C) because outi(O′, A) = Cn({p′1, . . . , p′m})
is consistent with C and adding anything from {(>,¬p1), . . . , (>,¬pm), (>,Φ)}
to O′ will destroy the consistency. Note that ¬Φ ∈ Cn({p′1, . . . , p′m}) by the
construction of {p′1, . . . , p′m}. Therefore Φ 6∈ outi(O′, A), which further implies that
Φ 6∈ out∩i (O,A,C).
So, we have reduced the validity problem of 2-QBF∀ to the full-meet fulfillment prob-
lem, which shows the latter is coNPNP hard. a
3.4 Complexity of permissive input/output logic
In this section we study the complexity of the following decision problems about permis-
sive input/output logic: given a finite set of norms N = (O,P ), a finite set of input A
and a formula x:
• negative permission checking: is x ∈ NegPermi(N,A)?
• positive-static permission checking: is x ∈ StaPermi(N,A)?
• positive-dynamic permission checking: is x ∈ DyPermi(N,A)?
Negative permission checking is relatively easy because it is simply the complement
of the fulfillment problem.
Theorem 3.20
1. For i ∈ {1, 2, 4}, the negative permission checking is NP complete.
2. For i = 3, negative permission checking is NP hard and in PNP.
Proof The negative permission checking is complement to the fulfillment problem. That
is, x ∈ NegPermi(N,A) iff ¬x 6∈ outi(O,A). Therefore the complexity of the negative
permission checking problem belongs to the complement complexity class of the fulfill-
ment problem. a
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Positive-static permission checking is no harder than the fulfillment problem because
both the class coNP and PNP are closed under finite union.
Theorem 3.21
1. For i ∈ {1, 2, 4}, the positive-static permission checking is coNP complete.
2. For i = 3, the positive-static permission checking is coNP hard and in PNP.
Proof
1. Let P = {(a1, x1), . . . , (an, xn)}. Then x ∈ StaPermi(N,A) iff x ∈ outi(O ∪
{(a1, x1)}, A) ∪ . . . ∪ outi(O ∪ {(an, xn)}, A) iff x ∈ outi(O ∪ {(a1, x1)}, A) or x ∈
outi(O ∪ {(a2, x2)}, A) or . . . or x ∈ outi(O ∪ {(an, xn)}, A). Since the coNP class
is closed under finite union, we know that the positive-static permission checking
problem is in coNP. The coNP hardness can be proved by setting P = ∅ and reduce
the fulfillment problem to the static permission checking problem.
2. Similar to the above item. The PNP membership follows from the fact that the PNP
class is closed under finite union. a
Positive-dynamic permission checking is harder than other permission checking as
the following theorem shows. The main source of complexity is that in positive-dynamic
permission checking we have to first guess a consistent input and then check if it produced
some inconsistency.
Theorem 3.22 For i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, the positive-dynamic permission checking is NPNP
complete.
Proof The NPNP membership follows by guessing a consistent set of formulae C ⊆ f(O)∪
f(P ) ∪ A, where f(O) = {a : (a, x) ∈ O} and f(P ) = {b : (b, y) ∈ P}, then using an NP
oracle to check if ⊥ ∈ StaPermi(N,C) ∪ outi(O ∪ {(
∧
A,¬x)}, C).
Concerning the NPNP hardness, we show that the validity problem of 2-QBF∃ can be
reduced to the positive-dynamic permission checking problem.
Let ∃p1 . . . pm∀q1 . . . qnΦ be a 2-QBF∃ where Φ is a propositional formula contains
variables only in {p1, . . . pm, q1, . . . , qn}.
LetN = (O,P ) whereO = {(p1, p1), . . . , (pm, pm), (¬p1,¬p1), . . . , (¬pm,¬pm), (Φ,⊥),
(¬Φ,>)}, P = ∅, A = ∅, x = ⊥. Our aim is to prove that ∃p1 . . . pm∀q1 . . . qnΦ is valid
iff x ∈ DyPermi(N,A).
Note that x ∈ DyPermi(N,A) iff there is a consistent set C such that StaPermi(N,
C)∪outi(O∪{(
∧
A,¬x)}, C) is inconsistent, which means there is a consistent set C such
that outi(O,C) ∪ outi(O ∪ {(>,¬⊥)}, C) is inconsistent. This is equivalent to say that
there is a consistent set C such that outi(O,C) is inconsistent. Moreover, the following
are equivalent:
• There is a consistent set C such that outi(O,C) is inconsistent.
• There is a consistent C which is a subset of f(O) such that outi(O,C) is inconsistent.
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• There is a set C which is a maximal consistent subset of f(O) such that outi(O,C)
is inconsistent.
Therefore x ∈ DyPermi(N,A) iff there is a set C which is a maximal consistent subset
of f(O) such that outi(O,C) is inconsistent. We now show that ∃p1 . . . pm∀q1 . . . qnΦ is
valid iff there is a set C which is a maximal consistent subset of f(O) such that outi(O,C)
is inconsistent.
• If ∃p1 . . . pm∀q1 . . . qnΦ is valid, then there is a valuation V for {p1, . . . , pm} such
that for all valuations V ′ for {q1, . . . , qn}, V ∪ V ′ gives truth value 1 to Φ.
Let C = {p′1, . . . , p′m,Φ}, where each p′i is pi if pi ∈ V and it is ¬pi if pi 6∈ V . Then
C is a maximal consistent subset of f(O). Moreover ⊥ ∈ outi(O,C) because Φ ∈ C
and (Φ,⊥) ∈ O.
• If ∃p1 . . . pm∀q1 . . . qnΦ is not valid, then for all valuations V for {p1, . . . , pm} there
is a valuation V ′ for {q1, . . . , qn} such that V ∪ V ′ gives truth value 0 to Φ and
1 to ¬φ. Let C = {p′1, . . . , p′m,¬Φ}, where each p′i is pi if pi ∈ V and it is ¬pi if
pi 6∈ V . Then C is a maximal consistent subset of f(O). Therefore outi(O,C) =
Cn({p′1, . . . , p′m,>}) which is consistent.
So we have reduced the validity problem of 2-QBF∃ to the dynamic permission check-
ing problem, which shows the latter is NPNP hard. a
4 Related work
The complexity results shown above are not so comforting with respect to the goal of
using input/output logic in practical applications in computer science, e.g., applications
in legal informatics (Boella, Di Caro, and Robaldo, 2013), (Boella et al., 2015) and
machine ethics (Anderson and Anderson, 2011), (Sun and Robaldo, 2016). But we are
still optimistic about the future of input/output logic in that sense because it seems the
competitors of input/output logic face no less problems than input/output logic.
Furthermore, it must be noticed that nowadays there are automatic theorem provers
such as systems of answer set programming (Gebser et al., 2012) which gives empirically
good performance on NP hard problems.
As stated in the Introduction, input/output logic is a deontic framework for nor-
mative reasoning grounded on norm-based semantics. Norm-based semantics have been
proposed as an alternative to standard deontic frameworks grounded on possible-world
semantics, such as STIT logic (Horty, 2001) and dynamic deontic logic (Meyer, 1988;
van der Meyden, 1996).
Possible-world semantics adds an extra machinery that makes the overall computa-
tional complexity worse than the one we found for input/output logic. For instance,
(Schwarzentruber and Semmling, 2014) proved that group-STIT, which has been used
to build deontic STIT (Horty, 2001), is undecidable. On the other hand, (Fischer and
Ladner, 1979) and (Pratt, 1980) proved that the computational complexity of dynamic
logic is EXPTIME-complete.
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For these reasons, we believe norm-based semantics is superior to possible-world se-
mantics from the computational complexity point of view.
However, input/output logic is not the only logic grounded non possible-world se-
mantics. Other three relevant deontic logics based on non possible-world semantics are
imperative logic (Hansen, 2008), prioritized default logic (Horty, 2012), and defeasible
deontic logic (Governatori et al., 2013).
Hansen’s imperative logic aims at properly representing and enabling reasoning on
imperatives, e.g. “close the door!”, thus it has an objective indeed different from the one
of input/output logic. However, imperatives and norms are strongly related, as explained
in (Gabbay et al., 2014) (pp. 137-191) first of all because they are both non-declarative
prescriptive statements, which do not bear truth values. Hansen’s imperative logic is
built upon unconstrained input/output logic; the added value is a non possible-world
semantics where imperatives are assigned priorities and ranked accordingly.
Priorities are also the basic mechanism of Horty’s prioritized default logic, which
extends standard Reiter’s default logic (Reiter, 1987) by ranking default rules in order
to handle moral conflicts. Many examples of how these moral conflicts are modeled in
Horty’s logic may be found in (Horty, 2012). According to (Parent, 2011), prioritized
default logic is particularly suitable for normative reasoning in that it takes reasons as the
basic normative concept. However, it fails to properly address more “realistic” scenarios
in which multiple norms conflict of one another. In light of these counterexamples,
(Parent, 2011), drawing from (Boella and van der Torre, 2003), develops an extension of
input/output logic with prioritized norms in order to handle further moral conflicts that
Horty’s logic is unable to solve.
The complexity of Hansen’s imperative logic and the one of Horty’s prioritized default
logic have not been studied yet. Of course, adding priorities affects the complexity. We
hope the present work can serve at least as a starting point to provide an answer to the
complexity problem of Hansen’s and Horty’s logic. On the other hand, extending our
complexity results to prioritized input/output logic will be the object of our future work.
Complexity results are shown for defeasible deontic logic. In particular, in (Governa-
tori et al., 2013), it is shown that the approach is computationally tractable. However,
it must be noticed that the object logic used in (Governatori et al., 2013) has a quite
reduced expressivity, in that it only allows (modal) literals. The object logic is built by
taking a small fragment of propositional logic that only includes propositional symbols
and their negations. Other two modal operators, which respectively model obligatory
and permissive modalities, may be applied to the propositional literals in order to ob-
tain modal literals. Finally, further operators to model priorities are introduced and
wrapped around the formulae in the object logic. Given the simplicity of the object
logic, tractability comes out easily.
Another final recent approach worth mentioning is the one of (Straßer, Beirlaenz, and
van de Puttey, 2015), which proposes a translation of constrained input/output logic
into adaptive logic (Batens, 2007). At the end of their paper, the authors consider the
complexity of constrained input/output logic as their future work. They tend to investi-
gate whether the complexity results of adaptive logic can be transferred to constrained
input/output logic. While adaptive logic is undecidable (Verdee, 2009), our results show
that constrained input/output logic is computationally more efficient than adaptive logic.
On the other hand, it seems the translation of constrained input/output logic gives us a
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decidable fragment of adaptive logic.
Similarly, this paper enables other directions of further research for some non-standard
input/output logic systems that have been subsequently proposed in the literature, and
for which decidability/complexity results are unknown. For instance, several different
unconstrained input/output logics have been developed in (Stolpe, 2008) and (Parent
and van der Torre, 2014).
And, other notions of permission have been studied in (Stolpe, 2010), who showed
convincingly that (Makinson and van der Torre, 2003a)’s notion of positive permission
is problematic, and proposed an alternative account in input/output logic centered on
the notion of permission as exception. The approach of (Stolpe, 2010) has been later
criticized in (Hansen, 2014), who proposes a unifying framework in which norms are
assigned with priorities such that both (Makinson and van der Torre, 2003a)’s dynamic
permission and (Stolpe, 2010)’s permission as exception can be characterized.
One limitation of (Hansen, 2014) is that it only applies to unconditional norms. In
our future works, we aim at extending (Hansen, 2014)’s framework to conditional norms
in order to obtain a powerful logic of permission using prioritized input/output logic,
drawing from the solution we recently proposed in (Sun, Zhao, and Robaldo, 2017).
The complexity results presented in section 2.3 will provide a basis for the study of the
complexity of our future account of permission.
Other future works concern the extension of input/output logic beyond the propo-
sitional level, in order to make the framework suitable for practical applications (cf.
(Robaldo and Sun, 2017), which integrates in input/output logic flat semantic represen-
tations for natural language semantics similar to those advocated in (Robaldo, 2010) and
(Robaldo, Szymanik, and Meijering, 2014)). Since standard first-order logic is already
semi-decidable, we expect the overall complexity to be intractable. In order to keep the
complexity under control, we will consider fragments of first-order logic and/or reducing
the set of axioms used in the input/output systems.
5 Conclusions
The present paper is the first relevant work that gives a full characterization of ba-
sic computational tasks in input/output logic, namely: (1) fulfillment problem of un-
constrained input/output logic (2) consistency checking, (3) maxfamily membership,
(4) skeptical/credulous non-monotonic reasoning, and (5) negative, positive-static, and
positive-dynamic permission checking. Our main finding is that the computational tasks
from (1) to (5) are coNP/NP hard and in the 2nd level of the polynomial hierarchy.
It is well-known in theoretical computer science that complexity is an indispensable
component of every logic. Past literature on input/output logic focuses on proof theory
and semantics only, and neglects complexity. The present paper fills the missing gap.
The complexity results are not so comforting with respect to the goal of using in-
put/output logic in practical applications in computer science. Nevertheless, a survey
of main existing relevant frameworks in normative reasoning reveals that none of them
appears to be a viable alternative to input/output logic. In our future works we will
investigate specific ad-hoc solutions to control complexity on each practical application
where we want to employ the formalism or its extensions.
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